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The Middle Eastern Societies
Institutional Trust in Political Turmoil and Stasis
By
Noor Darwish1
ABSTRACT. There is a general lack of citizen trust in governmental
institutions in the Middle East, especially because of changing of
governments and resulting turmoil. Sequential Mixed Methodology was
used, in which data from the 2016 Arab Barometer were supplemented
with qualitative insights from two professionals knowledgeable about the
political climate in the Middle East and content analyses of relevant
journalistic accounts. A comparison of North Africa (characterized by
political turmoil) and the Levant (political stasis) countries in how
government functionality (efficacy, stability, and corruption), as
perceived by their citizens, differentially colored trust in governmental
institutions was used to illustrate the citizen-government dynamics that
resulted in citizens questioning the legitimacy of government authority.
Predictions, based on Max Weber’s theory of Political Legitimacy and
Gaetano Mosca’s Elite Theory, that, on balance, functional governments
will garner more citizen’s trust in the Levant than in North Africa, while
corruption will have a more corrosive effect were supported. A trust
surplus occurred as a result of governmental functionality, balancing out
the trust deficit created by government dysfunctionality. These findings
contributed to existing theoretical and empirical literature on the
contested relationship between citizens and their governments.
Additional research on sectarian and ethnic conflicts and types of
government (monarchy, authoritarian, democratic) in the region as they
have shaped citizen trust is warranted.

INTRODUCTION

The Middle East is a hard region to define, primarily due to the wide range of countries,
the many languages or dialects, cultures, and traditions, it encompasses. Even though
the region has no standardized definition, it can generally be split into three groups. The
first group is comprised of the Gulf countries (Gulf Cooperation Council) which include
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar. The second group, referred to as the
“Levant”, is comprised of, but not limited to, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan. The
third is the “North Africa” group which includes Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.
The latter two is the focus in this research paper.
The Gulf countries have enjoyed economic success in the last few decades and are
considered powerful Middle Eastern countries on a global scale. But, over the last
couple of decades, many countries in the North African and Levantine regions of the
1
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Middle East have experienced turmoil as a result of multiple wars, including civil wars
and revolutions. Others look more static, even if in their extreme class inequality. For
example, among the Northern African countries, Egypt has gone through a revolution
and a political coup. Even though Algeria and Morocco have not recently been through
governmental turmoil, they are characterized by poverty and instability. In the Levant
camp, Syria is currently fighting a civil war and dealing with a huge refugee crisis,
Palestine is under military occupation of the Israeli army, and Jordan is in political stasis
but characterized by class inequality.
The Middle East is a region that is always featured in the news, often under the section
involving war, disaster and terrorism. Yet there is very little coverage and research
regarding the effects of the turmoil and dramatic change in governments and war on
citizens’ lives. Such lacunae are especially acute in the United States whose foreign
policy in the Middle East has greatly affected the political dynamics of its current
landscape. Consequently, the level of trust Middle East citizens have in their
governmental bodies have decreased over the last couple of decades.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There is much scholarly literature on the politico-historical events that have occurred
over the last few decades in the Middle East, specifically in the Levant and North
African regions. Another stream in the Middle East scholarship has been about the
economics-citizen trust equation, and the relationship between corruption and trust.
The New Arab Order and Political Trust
The 2011 uprisings that occurred across the Middle East created a “New Arab Order.”
But soon after, the hopes of new democratic reform to replace autocratic regimes
vanished. The uprisings were a result of citizen frustration with their countries stagnant
economy and lack of political freedom (Lynch 2018:120). In the end, regimes were
either overthrown as the byproduct of popular uprisings, or remained standing, as a
result of the failure of popular uprising, or did not experience any popular uprisings. In
either event, a shift was created in which traditionally strong powers such as Egypt2
have collapsed and are now “barely functional states” (Lynch 2018:116). On the other
hand, Gulf countries, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for
historical and unique global economic reasons, have been able to maintain a strong
political and economic presence in both the Middle East and worldwide; these Gulf
countries were not part of the Arab Barometer survey, and are not included in this
research.
On the world stage, the Middle East has become a playground for both Western major
powers and other powers such as Russia, to achieve their own political and economic
goals. Power in the Middle East operates through “influence peddling and proxy
2
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warfare” (Lynch 2018:116). As a result, there is great sense of insecurity among the
citizenry of the Middle East; for example, citizens are unsure of the likelihood of another
uprising or civil war. In this volatile political climate, academics, politicians and others
have posed important questions about the impacts of failed states, unresolved crises of
governance, unrest and the resulting turmoil on the political attitudes of citizens.
For one, the protests that swept through the North African and Levantine regions of the
Middle East changed “two key civic attitudes, trust and tolerance”, fundamental to wellfunctioning democracies (Spierings 2017:4). Niels Spierings synchronized over 40 Arab
Barometer and World Values Survey conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan,
Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, and Yemen, from before and after the uprisings.
Using macro-level analysis, Spiering associated a fall in political-institutional trust with
the uprisings in countries that went through democratic reform or regime change.
Politics became less trustworthy to citizens as a result of “misbehaving” politicians and
unsuccessful social reform policies.
North Africa and the Origins of the Arab Spring
The North African region of the Middle East includes Morocco, Libya, Sudan, Egypt and
Tunisia, and Algeria. Tunisia was the birthplace of the Arab Spring in 2011, when
Mohammed Bouzaizi, a street vendor, set himself on fire as a form of protest. His action
was a catalyst for the wider Arab Spring. Since then, democracy and reform have
become the focal point of pride in a region that needed it (Bremmer 2019). Protesters
demanded that the government tackle rising corruption, reduce income inequality,
create jobs, and increase wages. However, Bremer claimed that even though a
democratic regime replaced the former president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, it has not
been a successful transition. For example, almost ten years later, Tunisia ’s
unemployment rate is 30%, GDP per capita is low, wages are stagnant, and there is
heavy dependence on financial support from the International Monetary Fund. Amidst
such economic chaos, almost 11,000 demonstrations took place in 2018.
Like Tunisia, Egypt, also saw the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 and in 2012,
Mohamed Morsi, who represented the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected president.
However, the democratic period in Egypt only lasted till 2014, when a military coup,
spearheaded by Abed Fattah el-Sisi, led to the return of an authoritarian regime. The
military coup used disorder of the popular protest to assume power (Ketchley 2018).
Currently, Abdel Fattah el- Sisi's push towards a presidential term extension, by
changing the constitution, is indicative of the corruption and illegitimacy of his reign.
Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Morocco, the third country in the North African region, did not
experience a change in government. However, in 2011, a new constitution was
introduced that aimed to improve democracy and the rule of law (Al Jazeera and
Agencies 2011). In addition, a stronger separation of powers within governmental
branches was created, giving the prime minister and parliament more executive
authority and ultimately reducing the authority of the King Mohammed VI. The
referendum on constitutional reforms, held on July 1st 2011, was approved by 98.49%
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of voters, legitimizing the authoritative governing system in Morocco (No Author[a], BBC
News 2011). Yet, despite the reforms, and increased transparency, corruption remains
a major problem within the country, and elected officials power to change policy is
heavily constrained (No Author[b], Freedom House 2019).
Algeria the fourth country in the North Africa region, suffered through a civil war during
the 1990’s, which resulted in the death of 100,000 Algerians (Algiers, Economist 2012).
On May 10 1992, a general election was held. However, the electoral change was not
deemed as revolutionary, especially considering that the 1992 elections were hijacked
by the army in order to stop the Islamic Salvation Front from winning (Algiers 2012). On
January 12, 2011 26-year-old Mohamed Aouichia set himself on fire in Algeria. The next
day, January 13, 2011, Mohsen Bouterfif also set himself on fire. The two suicides were
followed by many others causing hundreds of protesters to take to the streets. In
response, a National Coordination for Change and Democracy was created with the aim
of seeking systemic change. However, these protests notwithstanding, Algeria remained
unaffected by the Arab Spring, mostly because it was recovering from the civil war and
Algerians were fearful of further instability (Daoud 2015).
The Levant
The Levantine region of the Middle East, the second considered in this paper, includes
Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Syria, Israel; the region is sometimes extended to include
Cyprus and Turkey. This region has faced intractable sectarian and ethnocentric
conflicts, including, but not limited to the Palestinian-Israeli crisis, the independence
struggle of the Kurds, and the rise of ISIS. The Levant is a volatile region that is deeply
affected by broader Middle Eastern conflicts. The geopolitical clash between the Iranled and Saudi-led camps, the ideological conflict among the Muslim Brotherhood
groups, and other religious conflicts has led to the internal fragmentation of the Levant
(Dalacoura 2018:32). Global actors, such as the United States and Russia, have also
contributed to the prolonged instability and vulnerable state of the region.
Lebanon, with its fairly longstanding constitutional system, was not affected by the Arab
Spring, much like its Levantine neighbors (Di Peri 2014). Yet, Lebanon experienced its
own “spring” in 2005, following the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Al
Hariri. His death was a catalyst of political change, which ultimately led to the end of
Syrian military occupation of Lebanon and the withdrawal of Syrian troops. Lebanon,
typified by confessionalism3, faces continued conflict in its civil society primarily because
of the power imbalance among the various religious, ethnic, and associated political
communities. But, even though the opportunity to change its political structure of
3

Confessionalism is a consciational system of government that proportionally allocates political
power among a country's communities according to their percentage of the population (Harb
2006). Per consciationalist governing principles: there is a proportional (numerical
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community leaders on common policies that serve all. But there is communal autonomy and
freedom for each community to determine its own affairs (as in personal status laws and mutual
veto power on any decisions deemed detrimental by any community.
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consciationalism, presented itself during the Arab Spring, it was lost because of
deepening sectarian divide and politics.
The legitimacy of the rule of Jordan’s monarchy was based on its rentier system
(Muasher 2018:114). A social contract, imposed from the top down, through public
spending rather than political participation, secured support for governmental and elite
rule. “In return for their patronage, states expected citizens to leave governing to a small
elite, which, over time, became more and more isolated from the general population”
(p.115). Unlike Lebanon and other Levantine countries, the instability in Jordan is more
economic than political. For example, the 2011 protests in Jordan began as a fight
against unemployment, inflation and corruption. A real constitutional monarchy and
electoral reforms were demanded by the people. In response, economic reforms were
introduced to address the holes in the social contract. But with no political changes, the
economic reforms, of privatization of state-run industries and liberalizing trading
systems, only ended up benefiting the elite as opposed to the general population. In the
end, the economic reforms were associated with the self-enrichment of elites (p. 11618). In the last decade, Jordan’s patronage system has been threatened as a result of
the declining financial support from oil-producing countries and the United States. While
Jordan has taken steps to pacify the protestors, such as firing three prime ministers and
reforming a third of the constitution after the 2011 protests, these measures have not
led to more power sharing between the monarchy and the judicial and legislative
branches of the government (Muasher 2018:121). In the long run, by buying the support
of its elite class, the monarchical government is able to operate, even if inefficiently, and
maintain is legitimacy.
The Palestine, another Levantine country, has been strife with economic and political
instability, primarily because of external political actors and internal strife. The
Palestine-Israeli conflict can arguably be said to be one of the main reasons for regional
distress in the Middle East. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 has been
the source instability both in Palestine and in the broader Middle East. The West Bank
is currently under military occupation; Gaza remains under military siege, and there
have been numerous bombings in the last decade. Yet, there has been no political
change, nor was the area directly affected by the Arab Spring in 2011. The Hamas
government has been the de-facto governmental institution in Gaza since its election in
2006, with Mohamoud Abbas as the president of the State of Palestine and Palestinian
National Authority. However, instability and resulting dysfunctionality, both as a result of
external forces, mainly Israel, and internal corruption, has become almost permanent.
Elliott Abrams, an American Diplomat, stated that "corruption is an insidious destroyer,
not only of Palestinian public finance but of faith in the entire political system” in his
testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Middle
East and South Asia (Elliot, CFR 2012).
In short, starting in 2011, the Middle East region has seen an uneasy mix of great
political turbulence and stasis. Even though the Levantine countries, such as Lebanon,
Jordan and Palestine, are characterized by political stasis but without major upheavals,
they were still affected by the neighboring uprisings and wider Middle Eastern instability.
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On the other hand, Northern African countries, except for Algeria, have witnessed
immense political turmoil. In either case, whether political stasis or turmoil, citizen trust
in the political institutions in the region has been shaky at best. In fact, according to
Global Corruption Barometer, despite half a decade since the Arab Spring, there is still
“widespread public dissatisfaction with government efforts to curb public sector graft”
(Pring 2016:5). Sixty-one percent of citizens in the region perceive corruption to have
increased in the last year.
Economic Vitality and Trust in Government
Aside from political volatilities and the resulting shattered citizen trust, scholars have
identified economic instability or lack of economic vitality as two other sources of citizen
discontent and distrust. Two distinct dimensions of economic instability, material
instability and perceptions of economic instability, have been noted for their eroding
influences on citizen trust.
Material Economic Instability and Trust Erosion
Economic stability, which has been scarce in the Middle East, particularly since 2011, is
an important element in the trust equation. Economic stability refers to stable, material
conditions in which a country offers its citizens job opportunities, opportunities for civil
and political involvement for its citizens, and flowing economic activity (Hashemi
2017:87). And sustained economic stability is expected to lead to a higher standard of
living for citizens. On the other hand, when there is economic instability in a country, the
socially and economically marginalized, especially its youth, feel frustrated and
powerless. Often, citizens hold the country’s government and/or its corporations
responsible for their economic security. Under these unstable conditions, it is not
surprising that youth participate in insurgency or political militant movements, further
deepening regional instability (p. 83).
Ironically, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region benefited from the wealth
created by the increase in oil prices in the1970s. However, failure to create employment
opportunities for the expanding labor force led to a deterioration in economic conditions.
Non-oil economies in the region rely heavily on “aid, capital flows, and worker
remittances” from the oil- producing Middle Eastern countries (Abed and Davoodi, IMF
2013). “Political fragmentation, recurring conflicts, and authoritarian rule have hampered
the development of democratic institutions and remain major obstacles to economic
reform” (Abed and Davoodi, IMF 2013). High-tariff barriers, imbalanced exchange rate
policies, limited advancement of human capital, and poor provision of basic public
goods and services are few of the many factors that have contributed to material or
objective lack of economic growth within the region (Abed and Davoodi, IMF 2013).
The material or objective strength of the economy is widely accepted to be directly
linked to citizen trust in institutions (Eccles 2015:17). Eccles referenced Nye’s (1997)
research which showed that governments who were unable to reduce unemployment,
increase economic growth and provide social services were unable to gain trust from
81
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citizens. Increased globalization has provided citizens with access to more information,
allowing them to be more aware of their rights and demand more from their
governments (Eccles 2015:19). Also, over the last few decades, “social modernization”
has led to the transformation of the relationship between citizens of the state and its
governmental body. The growing distrust and skepticism of younger, more educated
citizens has led to a new style of politics in which, as quoted by Eccles, there is “… less
deference to authority, more assertive styles of action, and higher expectations for the
democratic process” (p. 18). For example, Algerians protested against President
Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s decision to delay the April 18 presidential election despite
announcing that he will not continue his presidency of 20 years for a 5th term. However,
Bouteflika’s move to step down did not guarantee that the ruling elite, consisting of his
brother, the army and several industrial bosses, would relinquish their power (Nossiter
2019). Besides, while Algeria has natural gas reserves, the common citizens have seen
very little economic gain, leaving the youth very concerned about the lack of job
opportunities (Adamson and Charlton 2019).
Amidst such economic stagnancy, access to information has allowed citizens to more
accurately assess the income inequality in their country. If governments are responsible
for providing regulations that ensure stability, it follows that citizen trust in the efficiency
of governments will be measured through the type of policies and regulations
implemented as opposed to simply the quantity (Siems and Schnyder 2014). In fact,
these authors argued that since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, there has been a
worldwide call for more government intervention, “ordoliberalism”, to restart the market
economy so that citizens’ benefits, and interests can be furthered. Citizen awareness of
the unfair distribution of wealth within the country was commented on by an Executive
Director who was interviewed for this research (Interviewee #1). There is a pronounced
difference, she said, between the lifestyle of government officials and that of regular
working-class citizens. The government officials and leaders are always of the upper
class while citizens are of the lower or middle class, with notably fewer material
possessions and wealth. Therefore, citizens are demanding fair processes from their
governments. On balance, it is not surprising that over the last few decades, public trust
in government has been declining worldwide, including in the Middle East.
Perceptions of Government (In)Efficacy and Citizen Trust
A second stream in the literature on governments’ responsibility for economic stability
and trust is the public’s perceptions of government efficacy and of their wellbeing.
According to Tom van der Meer and Armen Hakhverdian (2016), while trust is based on
the merit of governmental bodies, it is not based on actual policy performance but on
the “perceptions of performance, accountability, impartiality, corruption” (p. 82). Meer
and Hakhverdian, in their study of 42 countries in Europe (51,255 respondents) also
showed that difference in process (greater accountability and impartiality), as opposed
to macro-economic outcomes, explained variations in political trust, measured by
“satisfaction with democracy” and “confidence in national political institutions” (p. 98).
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Other researchers who studied political trust have documented similar themes.
According to Kong (2013), based on the archival data of 7,182 citizens in the Asia
Barometer survey (2004), trust in government was contingent on government goodwill,
namely their intentions and purposes and the extent to which the governmental systems
operated in the best collective interest of the people. Institutional trust is also
competence-based, which directly links to the performance and the system's ability to
deal with problems. Trust in government is vital in order to have economic development
and progressive public policy (p. 847). Kong found that the more goodwill and
competence-based trust citizens had in their governments, the more satisfied they were
(p.854).
Corruption and Trust
Corruption is an extremely negative version of government efficacy. According to the
authors of the 2016 Arab Barometer (AlKhatib et al. 2018), financial and administrative
corruption was the second (17.2%) most important challenge that citizens felt their
country faced. Experts also posited that authoritarianism and corruption were two of the
three most important challenges facing the region as per the “Arab Voices” survey
conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Forty-eight out of the
one-hundred-and-three experts surveyed stated that corruption is among the most
pressing issue. Corruption takes many forms in the Middle East, including the use of
security and armed forces to quell uprisings, which helps maintain leaders in their
positions, derails the fight against political, minority and gender inequality and allows for
religious and minority oppression and prosecution (Aman 2017:172). Another 2016
Carnegie report titled “Arab Fractures: Citizens, States, and Social Contracts” also
underscored the fact that political and economic control is linked to cronyism and
corruption in the Middle East (Cammack et al. 2016). This linkage, they posited, must
be broken if sustainable private-sector economic growth is to emerge.
Restoring of Trust
Broken trust (interpersonal and political) can be both a cause and consequence of
corruption. Researchers have shown that countries characterized by corruption are
stuck in a circle, where corruption creates a climate of distrust which, in turn, generates
and nurtures more corruption. Restoring trust can be difficult since distrust “fosters a
tolerant or acquiescent attitude toward corruption and, by creating the expectation of
corrupt behavior among others, feeds individual participation in corruption” (Morris and
Klesner 2010:1260). The normalizing and tolerance of official wrongdoing creates the
casual expectation of negative conduct. Corruption erodes regime legitimacy, noted
Morris. According to 2016 Global Corruption Barometer of MENA, nearly one third of
citizens paid a bribe in the last year, approximately 50 million people. One in 3 people
paid a bribe to the courts, while 1 in 4 paid a bribe to the police. Despite this, citizens
feared retaliation if they spoke out about corruption, and 2 in 5 who did report corruption
suffered retaliation. The unfair distribution of services through bribery, which
undermines law and order, creates a negative environment that does not incite change.
Morris went on to argue that the mutual causality between distrust and corruption make
83
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it difficult to fight corruption; since distrust undermines citizen’s belief in governmental
promises to fight corruption and undermines governmental effort to mobilize society to
fight corruption. As a result, citizens tend to be cynical about politics therefore tend not
to participate in the political process as they believe that their actions will not have an
effect. As he Professor who was interviewed by the author (Interview #2) noted, feeling
of helplessness and the lack of empowerment to fight against government corruption
leads to not only lack of trust, but unwillingness to change the status quo.
No doubt, it is worthwhile, despite the declining levels of citizen trust, for societies and
their citizens, to ask how the broken trust can be restored. Chris Eccles (2015), in a
2005 survey of Canadian Citizens, documented that, in, despite the trend of declining
trust in governmental institutions, trust can be restored when public organizations
provide good leadership and management (50–65% impact), equal and ethical
treatment (10–15% impact), quality services (10–20% impact) and services that meet
citizens’ and community needs (10–25% impact). In other words, the more citizens
believed that governmental institutions benefit them, the more trust they had in the
institutions.
Suggestions for Future Research
Economic Vitality (or lack thereof) and corruption have had tremendous negative
impacts on citizen trust in the Middle East. The Arab Spring of 2011 dramatically
changed the political landscape of many countries. While some countries, such as
Libya, Sudan, Iran and Yemen, were not surveyed in the Arab Barometer, general
political trends can be found within countries in North Africa versus the Levant regions.
Many countries in North Africa experienced a change in regime type while in others
governmental systems remained the same. Further research is needed in order to
understand why certain governmental types, such as monarchies, despite corruption,
were able to retain power and legitimacy using top-down social contracts and access to
natural resources, while other governments and leaders were overthrown. Additionally,
ethno-sectarian tensions exist within many countries, and across border lines in the
region. For example, there has been an on-going religious Sunni and Shiite power
struggle which has divided the populations, challenged political boundaries, and fueled
terrorism and civil war. The polarization of identity groups has gravely affected stability
in the region. These factors need to be examined to assess the extent of which internal
conflict has affected citizen trust in governmental institutions and affected their
perceptions of their government’s ability to ensure the country’s stability and the
personal safety of all identity groups.
RESEARCH QUESTION
In this research, an attempt was made to compare the level of trust that citizens in North
Africa and the Levant region had in their governments’ functionality. Three dimensions
of functionality were measured: perceptions of citizen’s stability, government efficacy,
and corruption. Stability was indicated by feelings of personal safety and economic
84
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stability. Perceptions of government efficacy covered areas of economy, employment,
security and health. The third factor was corruption, based on perceptions of level
corruption, government efforts to combat it, and cronyism. The following question was
posed: “How does government functionality, as perceived by their citizens, differentially
affect their trust in institutions in North Africa and Levant?” The control variables used in
this research was level of education and gender to neutralize their potential confounding
effects on trust in the government.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In order to theoretically explain why and how perceptions of government efficacy and
stability, in particular personal economic stability and safety, as well as corruption affect
the level of trust citizens have in their governments in the both North Africa and the
Levant, political legitimacy and elite theory will be used. This analysis was theoretically
framed using a synthesis of conceptual ideas offered by Weber (1964) and Dahl’s
(1971) political legitimacy and Gaetano Mosca’s elite theories (1965).
Elite Political Legitimacy and Related Hypotheses
Political legitimacy refers to the right and acceptance of an authority, thereby giving the
authority figure, or institutions as the case might be, the right to exercise power. The
legitimacy of rulers or governments is derived from the population’s belief that the
governing power appropriately uses the country’s laws and the constitution. To quote
Max Weber “the basis of every system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of
willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of which persons exercising authority
are lent prestige” (Weber, 1964:382). Robert A. Dahl expanded on Weber and
compared legitimacy to a reservoir, where as long as the water is at a specific level,
political stability is maintained, while if it drops below the specific level, political
legitimacy is endangered (1971:124-88). Therefore, functional institutions, including
perceptions of government efficacy and stability, will legitimize their authority and
cultivate a trust surplus among its citizens.
Gaetano Mosca in his elite theory outlined in his “The Ruling Class” (Meisel 1965),
added more detailed nuances to the political legitimacy of elites. It is a given that
political legitimacy is needed for governing and that there is always those who are rulers
and those who are ruled. But, “the first class, always the less numerous” performs all
political functions, monopolizes power and favour the benefits that accompany such
power. On the other hand, the masses are directed and controlled by the ruling class,
“in a manner that is now more or less legal” (p. 50). But, Mosca argued that power is not
exclusively justified by the de facto possession of it, but states that those in power find a
moral and legal basis for it, further legitimizing and deeming it a “necessary
consequence of doctrines and beliefs” that are already recognized and accepted in
societies (p. 71). However, the isolation of lower classes, and their lack of accessibility
to the ruling class can lead to political upheaval (107). The consequent pressure arising
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from the discontent of the masses, who are swayed by their passions, can influence the
policies of the ruling class (p. 51). In other words, those who rule must garner the
support of the masses in order to maintain their power (p. 51). Such support is gained
through the consideration of the majorities’ beliefs and sentiments. Besides, in order for
the minority to remain in power, they must be organized and efficient so that they can
overcome the unorganized majority. Following Mosca’s elite political legitimacy
arguments, it can be argued that when governments are seen to be functional, they will
garner more citizen’s trust than otherwise. However, corruption can create a trust deficit,
by corroding the trust that governments have garnered through their efficient provision
of providing functional services to their citizens.
Applying these theoretical arguments to the citizen-elite dynamics in the Levant and
North Africa, elites in the Levant could be expected to garner more citizen trust than the
North African elite because Levantine elites have maintained political stasis or stability,
even if not economic progress. On the other hand, North African countries are not only
ridden with economic equalities but also have been in political turmoil, and have
experienced regime change which despite the hopes of many, did not bring about the
expected economic and social change. Against this background, the first hypothesis
tested in this study was: Functional governments will garner more citizen’s trust in the
Levant than in North Africa, net of corruption, level of education and gender”
(Hypothesis #1).
However, when citizens perceive corruption in their government their trust will be
shaken, creating a trust deficit. And given the volatile political histories of the North
African region (because of the numerous changes in types of governments or rulers),
the trust deficit caused by corruption is expected to be higher in North Africa than in the
Levant. The Levant, on the contrary, has been characterized by political stasis, with
stagnant governments and rulers, despite persistent economic inequality. Countries in
North Africa, on the other hand, have experienced leader and government changes as a
result of the Arab Spring yet also are burdened with economic and political turmoil.
Therefore, we can hypothesize that corruption will have a more corrosive effect on
citizen trust in North Africa than in the Levant. The many changes in the government
elite in North Africa and to the extent there continues to dysfunction in each new
government, there will be more net trust deficit, in North Africa than in the Levant
(Hypothesis #2).
METHODOLOGY
Sequential mixed methodology was used, where statistical analyses of survey data
were followed up with narrative accounting by journalists and other professionals to
further interpret the statistical findings. Secondary survey data from the Middle East
were used to measure and test the hypotheses about levels of trust in governmental
institutions in the North African and the Levantine regions of the Middle East. Two
narrative assessments provided by an Executive Director of an NGO in Lebanon and an
international studies professor at an academic institution were supplemented with
journalistic commentaries on the Middle East.
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Secondary Data source
The “Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan,
Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016” was a public survey conducted to
assess citizen attitudes about public affairs, governance, and social policy in their
countries of residence in the Middle East. Questions about the political, social, religious,
and cultural life of respondents were posed throughout the survey. In addition to some
general questions, respondents were asked to evaluate their political institutions and
political attitudes, elections and parliament, the media, democracy, social, religious and
cultural topics, the Arab world and international relations, and current affairs. The Arab
Barometer is vital to understanding key issues in the lives of ordinary citizens in Arab
society so that governmental and nongovernmental bodies can use the information to
base their solutions to the specific problems faced within specific countries and the
region as a whole.
“Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016” was carried out by eleven principal investigators
(AlKhatib et al. 2018). Interviews were conducted in Arabic in the respondent’s place of
residence to ensure a higher response rate and more truthful answers. The sample was
drawn with the use stratified multi-stage sampling to cover a nationally representative of
non- institutionalized adults aged 18 and above. In most countries the sample size was
1,200 citizens. Furthermore, 300 Syrian nationals living in Jordan and Lebanon were
interviewed. As shown in Appendix A, 49.9 % of the of the respondents were female
and 50.1% were male in all countries except Egypt and Palestine. In Jordan, Lebanon
and Tunisia 30.9% of the respondents had completed a secondary level of education
while in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Palestine 28.9% of the respondents did so.
Narrative Commentaries
Several journalistic accounts in newspaper outlets, that offer commentary on current
and past news in the Middle East, were used to ascertain on-the-ground perspectives
on government functioning and citizen responses. The newspaper outlets included “The
Economist,” “The New York Times” and “Al Jazeera.” In addition, two interviews were
conducted with professionals who have deep knowledge about the functioning (or
dysfunctions) of governmental institutions in North Africa and the Levant. The first
interviewee (Interviewee #1, Professor) is an international studies professor at a
university. Her specific focus is the Middle East. The second interviewee was an
Executive Director (Interviewee #2) at an NGO in Lebanon, and has worked directly with
the ministry of education to make education accessible to all children. She has
volunteered for the NGO for 10 years, and has been the executive director for three
years.
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DATA ANALYSIS
Three types of statistical analyses, disaggregated by North Africa and Levant, were
used in order to explore the validity of the hypotheses. Univariate analysis was, first,
used to describe the sample using trust in institutions, perceptions of government
efficacy, stability and corruption. Second, to explore the primary empirical relationship of
level of trust in governmental institution with perceptions of government efficacy,
stability, and corruption, bivariate correlations were used. Finally, multivariate analysis
was used to assess the net impact of perceptions of government efficacy, stability and
corruption on trust in governmental institutions. Illustrative examples of trust surplus and
deficits in North Africa and the Levant were drawn from the narrative commentaries
offered by journalists and professionals.
Operationalization and Descriptive Analysis
Overall, there was a low level of trust in governmental institutions in both regions. And
as might be expected in low citizen trust environments, the governments in both regions
were also judged to be less functional in their efficacy, their ability in maintaining
stability and had high corruption ratings. However, there were notable differences in the
two regions on trust as well as the functionality and dysfunctionality of their
governments. North Africans perceived their governmental institutions to be more
efficacious, stable, and less corrupt than their Levantine counterparts. More specifically,
citizens in North Africa rated their governments to be more efficient in operating three of
the four sectors considered; the economy, employment and security sector. It was only
the health sector that Levantine nation citizens found to be more efficacious than the
North Africans. An interesting note: even though citizens in the Levant believed that
there was more corruption and cronyism in their respective countries than their
counterparts in North Africa, the latter (North Africans) believed there was less
crackdown on corruption and bribes.
Trust in Institutions
Given the recent turmoil in the Middle East, the low trust in institutions in both regions
was to be expected. According to the Professor (Interviewee #2), economic hardship,
instability, lack of accountability and high level of corruption amongst government
institutions are the main factors that create trust deficits. The Executive Director
(Interviewee #1) added, in order for there to be a surplus of trust, there must be a high
level of ethics, transparency and accountability. However, for historical reasons
discussed at the start of this paper, citizens of North African nations trusted their
institutions a bit more than the Levantine citizens. The lower level of Levantine trust was
captured in the Trust index mean (𝑥) of 9.01 on a scale of 6-14, in contrast to the mean
(𝑥) of 10.16 in North Africa.
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Table 1.A. Trust in Institutions
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016
Concept
Dimensions Indicators
Responses
Statistics
North Africa
(n=4277)
Trust in
Institutions

Legislative
System

Q2011. Trust
in government
(council of
ministers)?

Judicial
Branch

Q2012. Trust
in the courts
and legal
system?

Executive
Branch

Q2013. Trust
in the elected
council of
representative
s (the
parliament)?
Q2016. Trust
do you have in
the armed
forces (the
army)?
Index of Trust
in Institutions1

Army

1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
4.

No trust at all
Not very much trust
Quite a lot of trust
A great deal of trust
No trust at all
Not very much trust
Quite a lot of trust
A great deal of trust

27.8%
27.7
29.3
15.3

Levant
(n=3405
)
47.1%***
21.3
22.2
9.4

23.9%
27.9
29.5
18.7

32.9%***
23.9
28.2
15.0

1.
2.
3.
4.

No trust at all
Not very much trust
Quite a lot of trust
A great deal of trust

41.7%
29.0
20.2
9.1

55.1%***
23.0
16.1
5.8

1.
2.
3.
4.

No trust at all
Not very much trust
Quite a lot of trust
A great deal of trust

3.9%
9.2
22.2
64.8

12.6%***
12.1
21.7
53.6

10.16
(3.01)
4-16

9.01***
(3.05)
4-16

Mean (𝑥)
(sd)
Min-Max

1

Index of Trust in Government: ReversedQ2011 + ReversedQ2012 + ReversedQ2013 + ReversedQ2016;
correlations among the indicators for North Africa ranged from 0.62*** to 0.18***; Levant 0.64*** to 0.11***;
*** p<=.001.

Some examples of the specific points of regional divergence in trust and mistrust are
worth noting. Citizens of both regions registered “a great deal of trust” in armed forces;
64.8% citizens in North Africa even if only 53.6% of Levant citizens. But there was more
distrust than trust in all the other sectors considered here, particularly in the Levant
nations. For example, in the Levant, 41.7% had “no trust at all” in the councils of
ministers as opposed to only 27.8% in North Africa. Citizens in the Levant also
distrusting of their courts and legal system; 32.9% of the citizens stated they had “no
trust at all” compared to the 23.9% in North Africa. A similar pattern of low Levantine
institutional trust (55.1% “no trust at all”) continued to the level of council of
representatives (in contrast to the 41.7% of North African citizens).
Functional Governments
Trust in governmental institutions was hypothesized to be a product of the
government’s functionality and dysfunctionality as evaluated by their citizens.
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Governments were considered to be functional based on how efficacious they were
perceived to be and how stable the citizens felt their lives were. On the other hand,
corruption was used to identify dysfunction within governmental institutions. According
to the Professor (Interviewee #2) there are negative perceptions of government
efficacy. Limited efficacy is a result of the lack of accountability leaders and
governmental institutions. In a sense, they are above the law. Whether leaders and
governmental institutions carry out their responsibilities efficiently or not, they will
almost never be punished or voted out of office.
Perceptions of Government Efficacy. Perceptions of Government Efficacy was
measured by how effective the citizens thought their governments were in managing
their respective countries. Citizen’s evaluated the performance of their own
government’s ability to effectively grow the economy, creating employment
opportunities, providing security, and offering health services. As illustrated in Table
1.B governments were perceived to be less efficacious, than not, in both regions; the
mean (𝑥) efficacious index score in North Africa was only 10.7 (on a scale from 5-20)
and 10.2 (𝑥) in the Levant region. With the exception of providing security, both sets of
governments were rated negatively (bad or very bad) than positively, and more so in
the Levant. It is only in providing health services that the Levant governments were
rated to be more effective than the North African governments.
The case of Lebanon is illustrative. In Lebanon, 34.5% of citizens believed that
government was not effective at managing the economy. Even though “Banque du
Libyan,” the government run central bank in Lebanon, has strived to preserve the twodecade old currency peg, the economy remained stagnant. The high interest rates have
increased the risk within the financial system and is “strangling an already depressed
economy” (Barrington 2018). Lebanon is currently the world’s third most indebted state
but needs urgent fiscal reform to help the economy. According to Barrington, regular
citizens are feeling the effects of the weak economy as annual growth rates has
decreased to 1-2%, lending is down, business activity is falling, and prices are falling in
the real estate sector, the pillar of the Lebanese economy.
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Table 1.B. Perception of Government Efficacy
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016
Concept
Dimensions Indicators
Responses
Statistics

Perception
of
Government
Efficacy

Economy

Security

Health

How would you evaluate:
Q2041. The current
government's
performance on managing
the economy?
Q2043. The current
government's
performance on narrowing
the gap between rich and
poor?
Q2042. The current
government's
performance on creating
employment
opportunities?
Q20421. The current
government's
performance on providing
security in the country?
Q2044. The current
government's
performance on improving
basic health services?
Index of Perceptions of
Government Efficacy 1

1. Very Bad
2. Bad
3. Good
4. Very
Good
1. Very Bad
2. Bad
3. Good
4. Very Good
1. Very Bad
2. Bad
3. Good
4. Very
Good
1. Very Bad
2. Bad
3. Good
4. Very
Good
1. Very Bad
2. Bad
3. Good
4. Very
Good
Mean (𝑥)
(sd)
Min -Max

North
Africa
(n=2076)
25.5%
37.7
33.6
3.2

Levant
(n=3350
)
34.5%***
35.5
27.0
3.0

44.1%
37.4
16.3
2.2

45.7%*
37.8
15.1
1.4

42.0%
37.5
18.4
2.1

50.1*%**
35.5
13.3
1.0

7.6%
12.6
54.6
25.2

23.6%***
20.0
33.4
23.0

28.4%
34.4
33.7
3.5

26.5%***
30.9
38.0
4.6

10.73
(2.97)
5-20

10.25***
(3.32)
5-20

1

Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy: ReversedQ2041 + ReversedQ2042 + ReversedQ20421 +
ReversedQ2011 + ReversedQ2043; correlations among the indicators for North Africa ranged from 0.49** to
0.25***; Levant 0.56** to 0.36***
***
p<=.001.

Stability. Governments in both regions fared a bit better (but not by much) in offering
their citizens stability (Table 1.C). But, as with trust and efficacy, North African citizens
felt more stable in their lives; on a summative index scale that ranged from 6-25, the
North African mean (𝑥) was 14.83 compared to 13.93 in the Levant. Citizen’s based
their perceptions about their stability on country’s economic stability and their personal
safety. For example, in North Africa 59.3% believed that their household economic
situation was “good” in comparison to only 48.9% of citizens in the Levant. Additionally,
52.4% of citizens in North Africa reported that the future of their own personal as well as
their family’s safety was ensured; only 35.3% of citizens in the Levant felt the same.
Additionally, citizens in the Levant were more concerned with a terrorist attack (13.3%)
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or of being harassed in the street (25.9%) than North African citizens (4.3% and 7.3%
respectively). In short, even in relatively unstable circumstances, North Africans felt that
there was more (than the Levantines) economic stability in their country and
experienced a higher degree of personal safety.
Table 1.C. Stability
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016
Concept
Dimensions Indicators
Responses
Statistics
North Africa Levant
(n=4586)
(n=3536)
Stability
Economic
How would you
1. Very Bad
29.7%
31.7%***
38.1
Stability
evaluate:
35.0
2. Bad
Q101. The current
32.3
27.6
3. Good
2.6
economic situation
3.1
4. Very Good
in your country?
Q101a. The
1. Much worse
8.5%
8.6%***
11.1
economic situation
2. Somewhat Worse 11.9
in your country five
3. Almost the same
18.5
years ago (before
26.8
as the current
the Arab uprisings)
situation
39.3
compared to the
30.4
4.
Somewhat better
current situation?
22.4
22.5
5. Much better
Q102b. Your current 5. Very Bad
10.3%
15.8%***
30.2
household
26.4
6. Bad
economic situation? 7. Good
59.3
48.9
5.1
4.1
8. Very Good
Personal
Q105. Do you
1. Absolutely not
7.6%
10.6%***
Safety
currently feel that
ensured
your own personal
14.9
24.9
2. Not ensured
as well as your
52.4
35.3
3. Ensured
29.3
family's safety and
25.1
security are ensured 4. Fully ensured
or not?
To what degree are
you worried about:
Q1072. A terrorist
attack in your
country.
Q1074. Being
harassed or
threatened on the
street.
Index of Stability1

1.
2.
3.
4.

Very much
Much
Not much
Not at all

79.6%
11.7
4.3
4.3

58.0%***
22.4
6.7
13.0

1.
2.
3.
4.

Very much
Much
Not much
Not at all

69.3%
16.7
6.6
7.3

38.6%***
13.3
22.2
25.9

13.93
(2.78)
6-25

14.83***
(3.49)
6-25

Mean
(sd)
Min-Max

1

Index of Stability: ReversedQ101 + ReversedQ101A + ReversedQ102B + ReversedQ105 + Q1072 + Q1074;
correlations among the indicators for North Africa ranged from -0.02*** to 0.60***; Levant -0.01*** to 0.55***
***
p<=.001.

While stability is crucial to citizens of the Middle East, democracy is not necessarily
perceived to be the solution (Interviewee #2). According to the Professor, in a state of
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instability and lack of personal safety, democracy and civil rights are considered a
luxury. As a result, citizens are willing to settle for an ineffective government if its leader
is able to guarantee, verbally at least, safety and economic security. In the Middle East,
history has shown that citizens have a preference for tough leaders over democratic
states and are willing to compromise on accountability and democracy in return of
survival.
Government Corruption as Dysfunction
In addition to assess the functionality of governments, citizens were asked to evaluate
the extent of corruption in their countries. Specifically, their perception of corruption
within state agencies, cronyism in employment, and the extent to which corruption was
being remedied was addressed. As shown in Table 1.D, both regions were marked by
high levels of corruption, but corruption was more rampant in the Levant; the mean (𝑥)
corruption index score was 10.09 (range of 4-12) in the Levant and 9.61 in North Africa.
Two examples to illustrate regional differences in corruption levels. One, there was a
notable difference in the level of cronyism; while 75.3% citizens in the Levant believed
that obtaining employment through connections is “extremely widespread,” only 61.5%
of citizens in North Africa thought so. Second, more than half (57.2%) of Levant citizens
believed that there was corruption in their state agencies to a “large extent” in
comparison to the 55.2% of North Africans. But, Levantine governments (35%) were
more likely to be seen as cracking down on corruption than the 25.2% of North Africans.
That is, even though corruption was more rampant in the Levant than in North Africa,
the former governments were doing more to combat corruption.
Once again, according to the Professor (Interviewee #2), high levels of corruption stem
from the ability of politicians, with the use of the country’s resources and the
international support, to push certain agendas and create divisions within the country.
Many citizens see governmental institutions as compromised or corrupted, and too tied
up in politics. For example, the people that are chosen to take high positions within
governmental institutions are based on political ties, as opposed to merit (Interviewee
#1). Adeel Malik, a professor at Oxford University, mentioned in Kassab’s article “The
cost of cronyism under Mubarak,” found significant cronyism between the late 1990’s
and 2001 in 385 companies in Egypt that had been associated the former president,
Hosni Mubarak. Similarly, 497 companies in Lebanon and 662 in Tunisia had strong ties
to the political regimes in place, while 370 in Morocco were owned by holding
companies indirectly controlled by the King (Kassab 2019). Besides, Kassab noted that
companies in Egypt that were politically associated with the regime received more
benefits. For example, they received 92% of the total loans granted to the private
sector, despite not having higher profitability compared to non-politically connected
firms.
Corruption, as shown in Table 1.D., had a more corrosive effect on citizen trust, creating
more trust deficit, in Levant than in North Africa. The empirical data from The Global
Corruption Barometer are illustrative. According to the Barometer 92% of citizens in
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Lebanon, 75% of Jordanian citizens and 70% of Palestinian citizens believe corruption
had increased. On the other hand, citizens in North Africa did not believe corruption had
increased as drastically as in the Levant. While 64% of citizens in Tunisia and 51% of
Algerians thought that corruption had increased, this was a stark contrast to the 28% of
Egyptians and 26%of Moroccans who held the similar belief.
Table 1.D. Corruption
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016
Concept
Dimensions Indicators
Responses
Statistics

Corruption

Perceptions

To what extent do
you think that:
Q210. There is
corruption within
the state agencies
and institutions in
your country?
Q211.The
governments
working to
crackdown on
corruption and root
out brides?
Q213. How to get
a job1.

Index of
Corruption2

North Africa
(n=4360)
2.7%
10.0
32.1
55.2

Levant
(n=3334)
3.7%***
8.4
30.6
57.2

1. Not at all
2. To a small extent
3. To a medium
extent
4. To a large extent

12.9%
34.1
27.8
25.2

10.2%***
28.9
25.9
35.0

1. I do not know of
any relevant
experiences
2. Employment is
mostly obtained
without
connections
3. Employment is
sometimes
obtained through
connections
4. Obtaining
employment
through
connections is
extremely
widespread

7.5%

2.0%***

3.5

2.6

27.5

20.0

61.5

75.3

Mean
(sd)
Min-Max

9.61
(1.80)
4-12

10.09***
(1.65)
4-12

1. Not at all
2. To a small extent
3. To a medium
extent
4. To a large extent

1

Some people say that nowadays it is impossible to get a job without connections (wasta) while others say that
jobs are only available to qualified candidates. Based on a recent experience (or experiences) you are
personally aware of, do you think that…?
2
Index of Corruption: ReversedQ210 + ReversedQ211 + ReversedQ213; correlations among the indicators for
North Africa ranged from 0.36*** to- 0.20***; Levant 0.40*** to 0.20***
***
p<=.001
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Bivariate analysis
A preliminary exploration of the connections of citizen trust with government efficacy,
stability, and corruption were conducted using bivariate correlations (Table 2 in
Appendix A). In North Africa, the more efficacious the government was perceived to be,
and the more stable their personal life was, the more likely they were to trust
governmental institutions (Efficacy r=0.47***, Stability r=0.31***). On the other hand,
perceived corruption reduced trust in North African societies (r= -0.47***). Similar
patterns were evident in the Levant region. For example, the more efficacious (r=0.59***)
and the more stable their lives were (r=0.36***), the more trusting they were of their
governments, but corruption led to less trust (r= -0.48***). As illustrated in Table 2, the
level of trust in institutions was more reflective of government efficacy, stability and
corruption in the Levant than in North Africa. Also, in both regions, the more educated
citizens were, the less trust they had, particularly in North Africa (North Africa r= -0.15***,
Levant r= -0.08**). Some gender differences were also evident, with men being more
trusting than women (North Africa r= -0.06***, Levant r= -0.05**).
Linear Regression Analysis
In order to test the robustness of the hypothesized regionalized connections of citizen
trust with functional-dysfunctional assessments of their governments and consequent
trust deficits, two linear regressions were run, one each for the two regions. The
functionality of governments was indicated by perceptions of government efficacy and
stability, while corruption levels represented dysfunctionality in governmental institutions
(Table 3).
In North Africa, on balance, perceptions of government efficacy were the main reason
for increased levels of trust (β= 0.25***). While citizen trust in their governments was
reduced by the corrosive negative effects of corruption (β=-0.29***), governments were
able to combat the negative consequences of corruption, with functional services and
stability. There was a parallel functionality-corruption-trust dynamic in the Levant. That
is, functional Levantine governments engendered much more citizen trust (β=0.41***)
than the negative trust consequences of governmental corruption (β=-0.23***).
Two additional trust connections, even if not as prominent as that of efficacy and
corruption, were noted. Economic and personal stability contributed some to cultivating
more trust in governments in both regions, even if more so in Northern Africa; Stability β
in North Africa = 0.10***and 0.07*** the Levant. And educated North African citizens were
less trusting of their governments (β = -0.12**than their Levantine counterparts (β = 0.04**).
Another look at the regional differences in the functionality-corruption balance in
engendering citizen trust revealed interesting lessons in trust surplus and deficits. In the
Levant, governments were able to cultivate a trust surplus; that is, the trust deficit
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caused by corruption (β=-0.23***) was more than compensated for by functional
governments (Efficacy β=0.41***and stability β=0.07**combined). While in North Africa,
citizen trust that efficacious governments and stability were able to garner (Efficacy
β=0.25***and stability β=0.10) were just about sufficient to make up for the corrosive
effects of corruption (β=-0.29***). In other words, the trust surplus created in the North
African region was significantly smaller than the trust surplus in the Levantine region.
Table 3. Regression Analysis of Trust in Government
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016; Beta (β) Coefficients1
Regression Coefficients (β)
North Africa

Levant

0.25***
0.10***

0.41**
0.07***

-0.29***

-0.23***

Education and Gender:
1. Level of education
2. Gender

-0.11***
-0.02

-0.04**
0.03

Model Statistics:
Constant
Adjusted R2
DF 1 & 2

11.19***
0.24****
5 & 3410

8.79***
0.38***
5 & 2955

Functional Governments:
1. Perceptions of Government Efficacy
2. Stability
Dysfunctional Governments:
1. Corruption

1

Index of Trust in Government: ReversedQ2011 + RevesexQ2012 + ReversedQ2013 + ReversedQ2016;
range 4-16;
Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy: ReversedQ2041 + ReversedQ2042 + ReversedQ20421 +
ReversedQ2043 + ReversedQ2043; range 5-20;
Index of Stability: ReversedQ101 + ReversedQ101A + ReversedQ102B +Reversed Q105 + Q1072 + Q1074;
range 6-25;
Index of Corruption: ReversedQ210 + ReversedQ211 + ReversedQ213; range 4-12;
Level of Education: (1) Illiterate/No formal education - (7) MA and above;
Gender: (0) Male - (1) Female.
***
p<=.001.

CONCLUSIONS
In this concluding section, the theoretical and political implications of the empirical
findings were reviewed. Some suggestions for future research to advance scholarly
understanding of the contested relationships between Middle Eastern citizens and their
governments were outlined.
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Empirical and Theoretical Implications
The quantitative findings indicated that a trust surplus in governmental institutions in the
Middle East was a result of positive perceptions of government efficacy, and stability. On
the other hand, corruption eroded citizen trust. However, while both the North African
and Levantine regions were able to garner an overall trust surplus, said surplus was
significantly smaller in North Africa than in the Levantine region. Educated Middle East
citizens were less trusting of their governments in both regions.
Some specifics of the trust dynamics between citizens and their leaders were found in
the narrative commentaries of professionals and journalistic accounts. For example, The
Professor (Interviewee #2) offered this scenario. Sectarian leaders are supported by
foreign leaders and are historically from wealthy families. Therefore, in return for loyalty
from their voters, they are able to provide tangible services, such as government jobs,
education to voter’s children in specific prestigious schools. The strong influence of
leaders on the citizens make it difficult to mobilize against leaders, because voters are
very dependent on these leaders. According to the Executive Director (Interviewee #1),
the dependent voter-politician relationship is harmful. Citizens prefer working in the
government public sector than in the private sector, because staying within the system
grantees them benefits they would not achieve otherwise. The reinter system, coupled
with corruption, allows for the elite class in the Middle East to continue controlling
resources and solidify their power. According to the Executive Director, the economic
differential between ordinary citizens and elites is vast; the government officials and
leaders are always of the upper class while citizens are of the lower or middle class, with
fewer material possessions and wealth.
In the Professor’s experience, there is no motivation for governmental institutions to help
and support citizens who do not have the ability to change the level of power of leaders,
because of both the lack of accountability and dependency of Middle Eastern citizens on
their leaders. Neither are the government agents motivated to facilitate economic
growth. Lack of accountability also contributes to the little confidence in leaders and
government agents, and ultimately leads to government inefficacy. Additionally,
widespread corruption, that goes hand in hand with lack of accountability, is quite
evident in the Middle East.
Citizens feel that the government is inefficient because they are corrupt. Yet, many do
not feel they can make a difference, although this sense of powerlessness is not
widespread throughout the region. As per the Global Corruption Barometer 2016 (Pring
2016) citizens in Tunisia felt empowered to help fight corruption, and believed ordinary
people are able to incite change (71%). Citizens in Jordan and Palestine, also had
positive outlooks on the ability for citizens to make a difference (66%). On the other
hand, half of the citizens in Morocco, Algeria, Lebanon and Egypt felt disempowered to
fight corruption. If left unaddressed, as the empirical findings presented in this paper has
shown, corruption in both regions will erode the trust surplus in government institutions.
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Theoretical Implications
From a theoretical standpoint, there was support in the linear regression findings (Figure
1) for predictions that were grounded in Max Weber and Gaetano Mosca’s Elite and
Legitimacy theories. As expected in first hypothesis, functional governments garnered
more citizen’s trust in the Levant than in North Africa, net of level of education and
gender. The economic equalities combined with the political turmoil that has roiled the
North African region, and the unmet expectations of economic and social change offer
an explanation. The legitimacy of governments (measured by trust surplus garnered by
government efficacy and stability versus trust deficits derived from corruption was also
higher in the Levant (Hypothesis #2) as a result of Levantine elites maintaining political
stability, even if not economic progress.
Figure 1: Empirical (Beta (β) Coefficients1) and Theoretical Models of the Impacts of Perceptions
of Government Efficacy, Stability and corruption on Trust in Government Institutions in North
Africa and the Levant2

2

Data source: Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon,
Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016; *** p <=.001.
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Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Despite the valuable insights presented in this research there is much left to be
uncovered about citizen trust in government institutions in the Middle East. The fact that
the adjusted R2 in North Africa was only 0.24*** and the Levantine R2 was 0.38***
indicated that there is more to the citizen-government dynamics than citizen perceptions
of government efficacy, stability, and corruption.
Further research on civil participation in politics of the region will be valuable. In the
Executive Director’s (Interviewee #2) perspective, citizens expect solutions to social
problems to come from the government, as opposed to a collaboration between citizens,
NGO’s and the government. The prevailing ethos in the Middle East is that because the
leader or government agency was elected, the responsibility lies completely with them,
without acknowledging the citizens’ role in the challenges they face. For example,
150,000 children of Syrian refugees have entered Lebanon in the recent years, exerting
extra pressure on the public schools. A proactive citizenry and support for these schools
could enhance the efficiency of existing governmental institutions. A bottom up
approach, through civil empowerment to participate and change the politics in favor of
citizens, will create a ripple effect, said the Professor (Interview #1).
The ethnocentric and secretariat conflicts that persist in the Middle East is another issue
that deserves more scholarly attention. According to the Professor, religion is
manipulated and used by government officials to maintain their position of power.
Besides, specific ethnic and religious minorities are discriminated against and are kept
out of political power or autonomy. Ethno-sectarian conflicts are more visible in the
Levantine region, especially in Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Lebanon. Based on the turmoil of
the last decade, and the growing insurgency and terrorist groups, such as ISIS, their
effects on corroding trust in governments in the Levant and North Africa need scholarly
attention.
APPENDICES
Appendix A. Demographic Controls: Gender and Level Of Education
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, and Tunisia, 20161
Concepts
Indicators
Responses
Statistics
Gender

Male or Female

Education

Level of
Education1

1

(0) Male
(1) Female
Mean (sd)
Min-Max
(n)

North Africa
50.1%
49.9
3.42 (1.67)
1-7
(4787)

Levant
49.7%
50.3
3.70
(1.31)***
1-7
(4200)

Level of Education: (1) Illiterate/No formal education - (7) MA and above.

99
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/svn/vol17/iss1/9

24

Darwish: The Middle Eastern Societies:Institutional Trust in Political Tur

Appendix B: Table 2. Correlation (r)
Arab Barometer: Public Opinion Survey Conducted in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestine, and Tunisia, 2016 1,2
Trust In
Perceptions Stability
Corruptio
Level of
Gender
Governm
of
n
Education
ent
Government
Efficacy
Trust In
1
0.589***
0.358***
-0.479***
-0.075***
0.049**
(n=3201)
(n=3405)
Government
(n=3350)
(n=3187)
(n=3405)
Perceptions
of
Government
Efficacy
Stability
Corruption
Level of
Education
Gender

0.471**
(n=3741)

1

0.495***
(n=3293)

-0.545***
(n=3117)

-0.060***
(n=3350)

0.050**
(n=3350)

0.305***
(n=4127)
-0.473***
(n=3959)
-0.152***
(n=4266)
0.063***
(n=4277)

0.413***
(n=3944)
-0.535**
(n=3802)
-0.052**
(n=4065)
0.067***
(n=4076)

1

-0.319***
(n=3284)
1

-0.019
(n=3536)
0.004
(n=3334)
1

-0.063***
(n=3536)
-0.060**
(n=3334)
-0.012**
(n=4200)
1

-0.310 ***
(n=4191)
0.052***
(n=4573)
-0.024
(n=4586)

0.113***
(n=4360)
-0.099***
(n=4586)

-0.164***
(n=4586)

1

Correlation below the diagonal of 1 is North Africa, while the correlation above is the Levant
Index of Trust in Government: ReversedQ2011 + RevesexQ2012 + ReversedQ2013 + ReversedQ2016; range
4-16;
Index of Perceptions of Government Efficacy: ReversedQ2041 + ReversedQ2042 + ReversedQ20421 +
ReversedQ2043 + ReversedQ2043; range 5-20;
Index of Stability: ReversedQ101 + ReversedQ101A + ReversedQ102B +Reversed Q105 + Q1072 + Q1074;
range 6-25;
Index of Corruption: ReversedQ210 + ReversedQ211 + ReversedQ213; range 4-12
Level of Education: (1) Illiterate/No formal education - (7) MA and above
Gender: (0) Male - (1) Female.
***
p<=.001.
2
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